Thesis Correspondence V

MacLeod (R. R. McIan)

Dear Dr. _____,

Here are three articles on Scottish history by Alan MacInnes, author of Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788. MacInnes has been really difficult to summarize, as he uses rather dense political history to illumine Scottish cultural history. I think from here, I'll read some of Corp's books, and then leave historiography behind me. If I need to touch up on a particular school, I can always get scholarship referenced in MacInnes's historiographical summary of Scottish history Early Modern Scotland: The Current State of Play.

Wesley

Notes on Repression and Conciliation: The Highland Dimension 1660-1688 by Allan I. MacInnes in The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 180, Part 2 (Oct., 1986).

In this article MacInnes demonstrates that Stuart suppression of the Covenanters only entailed a small part of Stuart policy to secure a repressive political military order over all of Scotland, including the Highlands. Whereas much scholarship has centered on the Covenanters, MacInnes focuses on Stuart policy on the Highlands. He shows that the Highlands were actually at a feuding all-time low when Charles II started initiating lock down policy, and most of organized crime actually happened in the Lowlands. Citing original court records, MacInnes notes criminal statistics for 1661-1674 as below:

                                                Lowlands           Lowland peripheries               Highlands

Crimes of aggression                  117                              16                                   18

Crimes against property              70                                25                                   22

He does offer the disclaimer that crime obviously exceeded documentation, but the clans also suppressed it internally before ad hoc panels of their own. Furthermore, the Highlanders never colluded in a common military effort like the Lowlanders. Raiding happened on a freelance basis and was sponsored by clan gentry instead of the chiefs. Furthermore, blackmailing predominated mostly among Highland criminal bands who had already broken with clan authority and were rented out by Lowland landlords always wishing to win territorial disputes among themselves. Nevertheless, Charles II's regime militarized a Highland watch, branded Highlanders as idle, and set the stage for William's Massacre of Glencoe scene.

Notes on The First Scottish Tories? by Allan I. MacInnes in The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 67, No. 183, Part 1 (Apr., 1988).

MacInnes uses the vernacular poem 'An Cobhernandori' dating around 1648-1649 to culturally infer a transplanting of the Irish Tory faction to Scotland. His argument hinges its reference to Angus MacDonald of Glengarry's venture to Ireland, from which MacInnes evaluates the political and intellectual connotations of the word “Tory” as translated into Scottish Gaelic. I really am helpless in abbreviating his very dense and brief argument without the following quote:

The lack of success which attended the embroilment of the Highland redshanks in the factional affairs of the Catholic Confederacy left Angus MacDonald vulnerable to criticism. His apparent failure to mobilize the majority of his clansmen in support of his Irish venture was now compounded by the less than glorious circumstances of his brief return to Glengarry. Thus, the political adaptation of the label 'Tory' – a term of abuse for his erstwhile Irish associates – suggests that an implicit criticism of his Irish venture was masked by the anonymous poet's explicit attack on the Covenanting establishment which contracted the Engagement. The transplanting of 'Toraidh' [Tory] may be deemed to serve a dual function in 'An Cobhernandori': as a general term of reproach for pursuers of military entanglements as well as a specific term of disparagement for the Engagers.

MacInnes may firmly conclude that the poem anticipates by thirty years the Tory label as a distinct political opposition to the Whig faction.

Notes on Treaty of Union: Voting Patterns and Political Influence by Allan I. MacInnes in the Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 14, No. 3 (51) Conference 1988 (1989).

Here is a quantitative analysis of the political proceedings leading up to the Treaty of Union. MacInnes summarizes the results of a database compilation of primary source material and scholarship of the diverse voting records of members of the Scottish Estates embroiled in the political conflict over Union. Whereas undoubtedly, the Treaty of Union depended on English manipulation, military intimidation, and Scottish economic defeatism, the database revealed statistics that seem to question “the extent to which all members of the Scottish estates were exposed or susceptible to political influence in favour of an incorporation union.” The Union was carried against public opposition according to data from receipt of petitions in 15 out of 33 shires and 21 of 67 royal burghs. One burgh commissioner voted for Union by mandate, but no other petitions from the constituencies favored union. Shire and burgh commissioners simply disregarded petitions from constituents. As protest mounted from the Opposition in hopes of delaying Union, 80 members (only 35%) failed to protest one way or other (for or against opposition to Union). Only 10 members did not vote within the categories of constitutional, political, and economic divisions; 2 being prohibited by office to vote, 2 were excused, and of the rest, only 2 others had excused absences. Most of all members voted in over 20 divisions, and 71 elite band members voted in more than 27 divisions. No one party had an absolute majority. Fourteen or less members cross-voted against their party in about 15 divisions. The Court and Squadrone activists clearly maintained more party discipline than the Opposition by holding onto a greater section of elite voters and having less cross-voting overall. Because the Opposition was denied a ready access to spoils of political office, it had much difficulty in maintaining cohesion, and as such the Opposition can no longer be considered a party. MacInnes concludes, “That principled commitment in the Scottish estates was a minority activity is not contested. But, that such commitment was the exclusive preserve of opponents of Union is insupportable.”