Thesis Correspondence IV

Charles Edward Stuart (1775)

Dear Dr. _____,

Frank McLynn authored a very good book Charles Edward Stuart: A Tragedy in Many Acts, in which he described the disposition of Prince Charles, his emotional fluctuations, and his perception of the Jacobite cause. In my opinion, it is a 557 page masterpiece because he does not force a thesis onto Jacobitism as a whole, but remains true to his task as a biographer. I do not mean to say that his book holds conceptions out of step with scholarship, but rather that he is somewhat beyond the standard Jacobite historiography, always looking at Prince Charles as a human being. The below article is completely opposite. It is also fairly old. In it, McLynn challenges concepts of international French absolutism in five pages; an undertaking which really requires a heavier source base and more analysis. Still, he does demonstrate that the French at least hypothetically entertained the idea of a Scottish republic after 1745, and dangled Prince Charles as the bait for the catch.

Wesley

Notes on An Eighteenth-Century Scots Republic? An Unlikely Project from Absolutist France by F. McLynn in The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 59, No. 168, Part 2 (Oct., 1980).

In the Maurepas Papers, McLynn discovered a very interesting plot to use Prince Charles as a Trojan horse to implement a Scots republic. The principle proponent of this strategy was none other than the French dispatch and investigator of the Jacobite 1745 campaign, Alexander de Boyer, Marquis d'Eguilles. He traveled with the army, was captured, and released six months later. He addressed Maurepas in a letter after his escape, and provided him with four possible policies: initiate a diversionary campaign until the English treaty was signed, begin an all out war to re-establish Stuart kingship across Britain, restore Stuart kingship to only Scotland, or build a Scottish republic. D'Eguilles feared that any pro-French concessions won through a diversion campaign might just as easily be secured by more economic means elsewhere. A complete Stuart restoration might risk a Stuart-Dutch alliance against France, and restoring the Stuarts to only Scotland might embroil Scotland in a war over dynastic succession in the British Isles that would concern France little, as the Stuarts would never willingly give up a claim to the English thrown. Accordingly, d'Eguilles favored a Scottish republic which would by definition erase the Stuart claim, and secure a Franco-Scottish alliance at no cost to French interests. However, such a plan was unlikely to succeed, as a French commander-in-chief would be needed to replace Irish commanders who would not fight for Scottish independence, and a French army secured to ensure no Irish/Scottish friction. Only Presbyterian Scotland would fight for republic, but they hated the French. The Highlanders, episcopalians, non-jurors, and Catholics would never give up the Stuart claim. Hence, D'Eguilles advised a gradual turn towards a republic over a period of three decades, and for the movement entertaining Prince Charles' hopes would be indispensable. McLynn concludes that these proposals were probably too radical for serious consideration in 1747. Yet, d'Eguilles' proposal is surprising, considering his Catholic pro-royalist family.