Dear Dr. _____,
Here are three articles on Scottish
history by Alan MacInnes, author of Clanship, Commerce and the
House of Stuart, 1603-1788.
MacInnes has been really difficult to summarize, as he uses rather
dense political history to illumine Scottish cultural history. I
think from here, I'll read some of Corp's books, and then leave
historiography behind me. If I need to touch up on a particular
school, I can always get scholarship referenced in MacInnes's
historiographical summary of Scottish history Early Modern
Scotland: The Current State of Play.
Wesley
Notes on Repression and
Conciliation: The Highland Dimension 1660-1688
by Allan I. MacInnes in The Scottish Historical Review,
Vol. 65, No. 180, Part 2 (Oct., 1986).
In this article
MacInnes demonstrates that Stuart suppression of the Covenanters only
entailed a small part of Stuart policy to secure a repressive
political military order over all of Scotland, including the
Highlands. Whereas much scholarship has centered on the Covenanters,
MacInnes focuses on Stuart policy on the Highlands. He shows that the
Highlands were actually at a feuding all-time low when Charles II
started initiating lock down policy, and most of organized crime
actually happened in the Lowlands. Citing original court records,
MacInnes notes criminal statistics for 1661-1674 as below:
Lowlands Lowland
peripheries Highlands
Crimes of
aggression 117 16 18
Crimes against
property 70 25 22
He
does offer the disclaimer that crime obviously exceeded
documentation, but the clans also suppressed it internally before ad
hoc panels of their own.
Furthermore, the Highlanders never colluded in a common military
effort like the Lowlanders. Raiding happened on a freelance basis and
was sponsored by clan gentry instead of the chiefs. Furthermore,
blackmailing predominated mostly among Highland criminal bands who
had already broken with clan authority and were rented out by Lowland
landlords always wishing to win territorial disputes among
themselves. Nevertheless, Charles II's regime militarized a Highland
watch, branded Highlanders as idle, and set the stage for William's
Massacre of Glencoe scene.
Notes
on The First Scottish Tories?
by Allan I. MacInnes in The Scottish Historical Review,
Vol. 67, No. 183, Part 1 (Apr., 1988).
MacInnes uses the
vernacular poem 'An Cobhernandori' dating around 1648-1649 to
culturally infer a transplanting of the Irish Tory faction to
Scotland. His argument hinges its reference to Angus MacDonald of
Glengarry's venture to Ireland, from which MacInnes evaluates the
political and intellectual connotations of the word “Tory” as
translated into Scottish Gaelic. I really am helpless in abbreviating
his very dense and brief argument without the following quote:
The lack of success which attended the embroilment of the Highland
redshanks in the factional affairs of the Catholic Confederacy left
Angus MacDonald vulnerable to criticism. His apparent failure to
mobilize the majority of his clansmen in support of his Irish venture
was now compounded by the less than glorious circumstances of his
brief return to Glengarry. Thus, the political adaptation of the
label 'Tory' – a term of abuse for his erstwhile Irish associates –
suggests that an implicit criticism of his Irish venture was masked
by the anonymous poet's explicit attack on the Covenanting
establishment which contracted the Engagement. The transplanting of
'Toraidh' [Tory] may be deemed to serve a dual function in 'An
Cobhernandori': as a general term of reproach for pursuers of
military entanglements as well as a specific term of disparagement
for the Engagers.
MacInnes may firmly
conclude that the poem anticipates by thirty years the Tory label as
a distinct political opposition to the Whig faction.
Notes on Treaty
of Union: Voting Patterns and Political Influence by Allan I.
MacInnes in the Historical Social Research / Historische
Sozialforschung, Vol. 14, No. 3 (51) Conference 1988 (1989).
Here is a
quantitative analysis of the political proceedings leading up to the
Treaty of Union. MacInnes summarizes the results of a database
compilation of primary source material and scholarship of the diverse
voting records of members of the Scottish Estates embroiled in the
political conflict over Union. Whereas undoubtedly, the Treaty of
Union depended on English manipulation, military intimidation, and
Scottish economic defeatism, the database revealed statistics that
seem to question “the extent to which all members of the Scottish
estates were exposed or susceptible to political influence in favour
of an incorporation union.” The Union was carried against public
opposition according to data from receipt of petitions in 15 out of
33 shires and 21 of 67 royal burghs. One burgh commissioner voted for
Union by mandate, but no other petitions from the constituencies
favored union. Shire and burgh commissioners simply disregarded
petitions from constituents. As protest mounted from the Opposition
in hopes of delaying Union, 80 members (only 35%) failed to protest
one way or other (for or against opposition to Union). Only 10
members did not vote within the categories of constitutional,
political, and economic divisions; 2 being prohibited by office to
vote, 2 were excused, and of the rest, only 2 others had excused
absences. Most of all members voted in over 20 divisions, and 71
elite band members voted in more than 27 divisions. No one party had
an absolute majority. Fourteen or less members cross-voted against
their party in about 15 divisions. The Court and Squadrone activists
clearly maintained more party discipline than the Opposition by
holding onto a greater section of elite voters and having less
cross-voting overall. Because the Opposition was denied a ready
access to spoils of political office, it had much difficulty in
maintaining cohesion, and as such the Opposition can no longer be
considered a party. MacInnes concludes, “That principled commitment
in the Scottish estates was a minority activity is not contested.
But, that such commitment was the exclusive preserve of opponents of
Union is insupportable.”
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